Conventionalizing Deterrence? U.S. Prompt Strike Programs and Their Limits

About a decade ago, the U.S. started to examine options to develop and acquire Conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities. This move fits in an effort to conventionalize deterrence, an effort initiated decades before and undertaken for profound and diverse motives. Although it has been renewed under the Obama administration, which aims to reduce the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, this ambition has resulted in very little concrete progress.
Budget cuts to defense spending and technological obstacles have forced the Pentagon to scale back its plans in terms of conventional strategic strike programs. Despite these setbacks, ten years from now the U.S. may well possess a conventional prompt strike capability in its arsenal. As a consequence, this paper also highlights some longer-term, operational and strategic issues that might arise from a context of crisis or war in which prompt strike capabilities could be used, and attempts to shed new light on the potential values these capabilities might have for U.S. national security.
Available in:
Regions and themes
ISBN / ISSN
Share
Download the full analysis
This page contains only a summary of our work. If you would like to have access to all the information from our research on the subject, you can download the full version in PDF format.
Conventionalizing Deterrence? U.S. Prompt Strike Programs and Their Limits
Related centers and programs
Discover our other research centers and programsFind out more
Discover all our analysesThe Hunt for Economic Security: The Role of Navies in Deterring Threats to the Maritime Economy
The maritime domain is currently faced with a wide variety of threats, such as climate change, economic warfare, shadow fleet operations, protection of critical infrastructures, and illicit activities ranging from illegal fishing to piracy. Navies suffer from inherent limitations when deterring threats to the global maritime economy: their global presence and permanence limits their credibility in terms of deterrence, their focus usually set on immediate deterrence, implementing deterrence by punishment in and from the naval domain is difficult and costly.
A Fragile Consensus? The Pressure on the Norm Against Nuclear Testing
Apart from North Korea, no state has conducted explosive nuclear tests in the 21st century, reflecting the emergence of a strong international norm against such testing.
The Franco-German Brigade and the Revival of European Defense
One thing has been clear since Donald Trump's return to the White House: the very existence of the European unification project is threatened. Unless it develops a sovereign defense policy to counter the war in Ukraine and the weakening of American security guarantees, the European Union will continue to see its internal cohesion and external attractiveness wane.
Taking the Pulse: Can Europeans Build Their Independent Extended Nuclear Deterrent?
Confronted with a U.S. disengagement and the Russian threat, Europeans are reconsidering their stance on nuclear deterrence. Given the capabilities of the French and British arsenals, can Europe develop an independent nuclear deterrent?